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II. Achieving Universal Values: 
Theological Reflections 
Compassion as a Global Programme 
for Christianity 
li!LLE liAKER 
Introduction: dangerous memory 
'Compassion as a global programme for Christianity?" That sounds pro-
vocative, and not only for the global ethic programme, which insists on a 
minimal consensus on values, criteria and basic attitudes that transcends 
cultures.' It sounds even more provocative for the current political tendency 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century - a tendency which Johann 
Baptist Metz has cuttingly labelled 'cultural amnesia'. 
Compassion as a global programme for Christianity as Metz understands 
it claims to be a universal programme at least for the religions, but in fact for 
humanity generally. So there is no retreat into the particular niche of the 
religious confession, which the liberalistic, compliant, amnetic culture of the 
religions all too readily points to. There is no communitarian relativistic 
programme which hurts no one and therefore can change nothing. To this 
degree Metz sees himself linked to his counterpart within theology, the 
global ethic programme. But unlike Kiing's catalogue of values and respon-
sibilities, compassion cannot even build on a minimal ethical consensus 
which makes individual virtues a responsibility, in so doing possibly under-
mining the notion of freedom and stamping the memory of the sufferers on 
all too tiny coins.3 • 
In view of the globalization which goes with a 'constitutional pluralism', 
the question arises, as Metz puts it, 'how a theology "with the face of the 
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world" ... goes on the offensive against this pluralism without evading the 
questions of truth and authority and without abandoning the conviction that 
Christianity also has something to say to all hm:nan beings precisely because 
of this constitutional pluralism'.• Accordingly, theology understood in uni-
versalistic terms must stand in the tradition of a 'reflective monotheism', a 
monotheism which understands 'God's passion as compassion', in other 
words 'as the compassion springing from God's passion, as a participatory 
perception of the suffering of the other, as active remembrance of the 
suffering of the other'.' This monotheism, with its concept of the unity 
of the love of God and neighbour, is in some sense a rival to a mysticism of 
suffering which is apolitical in the sense that it dissolves the relationship of 
mysticism and morality in favour of mysticism. 
Thought of as a political programme, compassion is the first element of a 
peace policy which allows the suffering of the other, the partner in the 
conflict, to stand alongside one's own suffering, which perceives it and 
integrates it into historical memory. Secondly, the notion of compassion can 
inspire a new politics of recognition, in so far as it sets the asymmetrical 
recognition of treaty partners alongside the symmetrical recognition. 
According to Metz this does not imply any emphatic concept of politics, but 
it does imply the necessary association of morality and politics. But thirdly, 
compassion may set cultural and political memory over against cultural 
amnesia, a memory which 'cries out for justice' and is opposed to political 
and cultural forgetfulness. 
The universalism of compassion is based on the universality of suffering. 
Rightly understood, reason subjects itself to the 'authority of the sufferers', 
whose universalistic 'claim to validity' must be perceived and acknow-
ledged. Reason, ethics and theology or the church, along with religions and 
cultures, cannot ignore this claim to the perception of the suffering of 
sufferers and the emotional and political recognition of their right - they can 
only submit to it. But is not the aim here the same as that of the 'consensus 
programme' in the global ethic? No, says Metz, for 'a global ethic is not a 
consensus product. Anyone who wants to derive this global ethic from 
assent alone forgets that the consensus, the assent, of all can be the con-
sequence of a universal claim but not its basis and criterion. 16 
Compassion is empathy, but also God's gracious concern for human 
beings and that of human beings for one another. Compassion is not a 
sophisticated concept of the Christian tradition but carries within itself a 
'dangerous memory' if one investigates its semantic history more closely. 
For compassion is also remembrance of God's care in the exodus experience, 
beliefin the resurrection of Christ and the hope for redemption. Thought of 
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in exclusively individualistic terms, the political dynamite of Christian faith 
would turn into bourgeois contentment or allow itself to be reduced to a 
postmodern future performance. With the memory of God's mercy the 
notion of compassion at the same time provokes the only appropriate 
human answer to human suffering.' Compassion is compassion towards the 
sufferers and participation in their suffering and as such is a central element 
oflove of neighbour. Metz is concerned with this ethical dimension, and that 
will be my concern here. 
I. The theology of Johann Baptist Metz 
I. Anamnetic reason 
Metz's main attention is focussed on the appropriateness of talk of God, 
which can be thought oflegitimately only in connection with talk and action 
of and with human beings. I want simply to mention four key theological 
terms which underlie the programme of compassion. 
First of all comes the key term anamnetic reason. It is more than the com-
plement to a 'pure' reason which is at core ahistorical. Anamnetic reason is 
also not only, as Habermas thinks, the 'invasion of philosophy (or theology) 
by historical thoughc'.8 It is rather chat 'dangerous memory' which in the 
Hebrew zkr combines memory with ethical impulse: 'Israel, remember your 
God who brought you up out of Egypt - remember your God who thought 
of you in Egypt.' Metz's concept of anamnetic reason, which he owes first of 
all to Walter Benjamin, is equally an ethical concept, and thus also at the 
same time a prophetic-political concept. With it Metz takes the field against 
'cultural amnesia', against the forgetting of the specific memory which today 
still in Germany is above all memory of the victims and perpetrators of 
Auschwitz, and he takes the field against forgetting the memory itself, which 
has found a place deep in our culture. 
Not only Judaism, but Christianity, too, is established on this principle of 
memory - the farewell discourses in the Gospel of John and the memorial 
meal itself point a clear way here. Anamnetic reason makes itself concrete 
in the memory of God in so far as this also expresses the memory of human 
suffering. 'To speak of this God means to express the suffering of others and 
to lament responsibility neglected and solidarity refused.'' Moreover it 
becomes concrete in the memory of Christ as the memoria passionis [the 
memory of his suffering]. We could say that compassion is an ethical impli-
cation of the anamnetic conception of reason understood theologically -
compassion, allowing oneself to be affected by the suffering of others, makes 
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the memory dangerous because and in that it looks the sufferers themselves 
in the eyes. As Psalm 22 also says of God: 'He does not hide his face from 
him, he has heard his cry.'" A further aspect seems to me important in the 
emphasis on a theology of memory, but now understood in the narrower 
sense of memory: memory is the mode of narrative, as is emphasized by 
all theories of narrative since Aristotle's Poetics. But now narrative is the 
medium of religious experience, remote from any romantic immediacy of 
the experience of God, which moreover here loses its identity as being in 
principle other. Rather, religious experience includes the reflective memory 
of the exodus narrative, the judgment, the repentance, the hope for redemp-
tion after the resurrection narrative, in short the memory of the history of 
God's covenant with his people and finally with all peoples, meant in the two 
senses of the word. So in respect ofreligious experiences, too, in the sense of 
the Jewish-Christian religion it is dangerous memory." 
2. Negative universalism 
The second key term that I want to mention is negative universalism, as the 
opposite to a universalism of domination. A universalism of domination at 
least implicitly imposes its own values on all possible cultures, but in con-
trast to imperialism does not have recourse to power and strength but to the 
'nature' of human beings or anthropological assumptions. Like Kung, Metz 
too is sceptical here: he takes the critique of various theoreticians of culture 
seriously, but on the basis of anamnetic reason formulates the universality of 
suffering as a universal evil as the starting point of ethical and cultural 
understanding,. This divided negative as a universal basis for understanding 
between cultures, as opposed to a minimal consensus of positive values, pro-
duces a strong motivation for universal responsibility and, Metz thinks, an 
obedience which precedes any moral foundation: 
Our 'neighbour' and thus partner in our responsibility is never just the 
one whom we regard and allow as such. The sphere of responsibility, the 
extent of this responsibility, is in principle unlimited. The criterion for its 
measure and extent is and remains the suffering of others, like the man 
who fell among robbers in Jesus' story, whom the priest and levite pass by 
'out of higher interests'. n 
For Jon Sobrino, the most massive form of suffering today is suffering 
from poverty, violence and structural injustice which slowly and violently 
leads to death. According to Metz, in language taken from Nelly Sachs, this 
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poverty, but also reflection on Auschwitz, is a 'landscape of screams', and 
this experience is the experience underlying compassion.'' 
But theology goes beyond the question of appropriate action in the face of 
the universality of suffering and thus the ethical question of how to deal with 
suffering. Theodicy raises the question of God - it begs for deliverance as 
Israel begs for deliverance, as Jesus calls on his God, and as all sufferers 
literally beg for deliverance somewhere. Theodicy is the perception of the 
suffering of others, the cry of theology for deliverance, a lament which does 
not know whether it will be heard, how it can ever be heard. And thus, as 
Ottmar Fuchs rightly says, it also becomes complaint against God, accusa-
tion. Care is one side of compassion as a response to the despair of sufferers. 
But the compassionate cry for justice is the other. 
3. Limited time and orthopraxy 
In view of this radicalization of the question of God as a question to God, my 
third key term is that according to Metz theology is always also eschatology, 
with a strong apocalyptic colouring. As Walter Benjamin has it, it is the 
expectation of the messianic time. Eschatological theology, as theology of the 
'limited time', to use Metz's words, expects, more impatiently than patiently 
in view of the suffering of specific individuals, a break in history, a break 
between the present and history which is a history of injustice and suffer-
ing. 14 
The fourth key term takes me back to the starting point, anamnetic 
reason. According to Metz, the justification of faith does not take place by 
means of a theoretical proof of God but is the orthopraxy [right action] which 
is the foundation of faith. Here again Metz knows that he is at one with the 
theology ofliberation: · 
In the face of a suffering world, one's primary reaction is that of a com-
passion intent on eliminating such suffering. Like any other human and 
Christian activity, theology participates in this primary reaction, though 
in its own specific way. Thus theology will become an intellectus amoris, 
which will include the historical specifications that love assumes when 
confronted with a suffering people (love as justice) ... In contemporary 
terminology, compassion becomes liberation. I am thus affirming that 
there is something ultimate, pre-theological and even pre-religious in 
such compassion, just as there is in the suffering of today's world.'' 
Along the lines which govern liberation theology, orthopraxy in the sense 
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of a theology of memory of the suffering of others means the quest for 
justice, a justice which is grounded in compassion. This specific compassion 
is not a compassion from above, but means the literal recognition of the 
other, who is not only the universal vulnerable human being but the concrete 
human being, who encounters people hurt, humiliated, robbed of their 
happiness. 
The whole of Metz's theology underlies these few key terms. But it also 
contains a question to the ethical approaches which are currently dominant, 
in so far as these start from an exclusively egalitarian universalism, and it 
implies a critique of any ethics which seeks to resolve conflicts of interests by 
morally legitimated processes (procedural approaches). 
But is the idea of compassion also as programmatic, as fundamental to 
ethics as Metz nevertheless suggests? Or on closer inspection does the 
ethical impulse which stems from it dissolve into a mere appeal for good 
will? Is there a correlation between compassion with a theological orienta-
tion and the ethic of compassion known to the ethical tradition? And can 
theological ethics make an independent contribution towards the mediating 
of theological and ethical understanding? So the theme of my second part 
is the question in what way empathy, or, more usually compassion, is 
expressed in ethical reflection. 
II. Compassion and empathy in ethics 
I. The origin and value of empathy 
Two sets of themes characterize the historical discussion of the concept of 
empathy. First there is the dispute over the origin of compassion: is this 
feeling innate and thus part of the human make up, is compassion a passive 
affect and to be determined largely independently of rationality, or is it first 
evoked by upbringing and thus an acquired virtue? No final verdict has been 
passed, but ethicists today are agreed that compassion or empathy can at any 
rate be dependent on upbringing and education. Despite all the criticism of 
the Enlightenment theatre of Lessing and Schiller, this was and still is the 
approach by means of aesthetics and ethics today, for example in Martha 
Nussbaum. 
Secondly, however, the history of the ethical discussion of compassion 
amounts to a dispute on the value and status of compassion: independently 
of their views of the basis for the sense of compassion, the English moral-
sense school, Rousseau, Lessing and especially the Romantics down to 
Schopenhauer see it as the virtue which makes it possible for human beings 
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to overcome their isolation and egotism. The defenders of an ethic of com-
passion say that compassion is an altruistic attitude in which morality is 
ultimately grounded. '6 
Wide of the mark, Nietzsche said mockingly, with reference above all to 
the great tradition of the opponents of compassion in the Stoa, that com-
passion is the expression of the greatest weakness of all in human beings, 
ultima,tely based on self-interest - out of delight at the gratitude of the 
victim or the approval of those around, also based on delight in suffering-and 
ultimately on fear - fear of one's own suffering and, in the history of evolu-
tion, fear of the threat from others whose movements, including changes of 
disposition, need to be studied so as to provide self-protection. '7 
The Stoics had already emphasized that compassion is blind, particular, 
subject to chance; it is the 'defect of a petty spirit which collapses at the sight 
of the suffering of others', as Seneca says. It is a deep conviction of Western 
moral philosophy that compassion is unworthy of a rational person (mean-
ing of course a man) and Hobbes still accepts this tradition: compassion is a 
perturbatio animi, a confusion of the spirit. 
These objections to compassion can be robbed of their force, since in the 
end they rest on far too narrow a view of reason and feelings, as we shall see; 
moreover, as Scheler has shown, they remain too rooted in a conception 
which sees compassion grounded in a reference back to oneself - like the 
moral impulse in the Golden Rule. '8 Nevertheless, the objections can help 
to develop a conception of ethics which can integrate compassion appro-
priately. Thus for example mediaeval theology gives compassion a specific 
function within ethics. For Thomas Aquinas, for instance, compassion 
becomes a virtue in so far as it converges with justice; in other words, justice 
is the criterion for the appropriateness of compassion. Here, however, the 
contribution of compassion is underestimated since, as I shall demonstrate, 
compassion is itself the expression of a comprehensive sense of justice. '9 
But another charge made by Nietzsche against the ethic of compassion 
hits the mark: compassion, he says, is not only self-interested and a product 
of the weak spirit, but in addition also knows no respect for the other. In 
other words, in some circumstances does not compassion extend the suffer-
ing of the other by regarding it as a condition from outside? How do we 
know, for example, whether a blind and deaf person is suffering and accord-
ingly needs our compassion? How can we think of compassion and respect at 
the same time? How can we separate contempt from compassion? 
It has to be conceded that the ethic of compassion has long failed to find 
an adequate answer to this charge. Among other reasons, this is because it 
has neglected to give an appropriate definition of the status of compassion 
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and feelings in relation to respect for others. It has been too concerned to 
warn against a rationalistic moral theory- often enough misunderstood - to 
want to see the limits of the ethics of feeling. If one defines the status of com-
passion in the mode of a moral principle, one misses its specific function for 
morality. But if, like Kant, one pushes the feelings right to the periphery of 
moral reflection, one similarly misses their function. So one can say that the 
discussion at the beginning of modern ethics does not lead to an adequate 
understanding of the relationship between compassion and respect. That is 
the historical situation. 
Now since in the current formation of theories the ethics of virtue is 
undergoing a renaissance which could not have been foreseen even twenty 
years ago, the ethic.of compassion is also reviving. The ethic of compassion 
is so to speak sailing in the wake of the ethic of virtue. Now if this is the case, 
and if the mistakes of the controversy in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries are to be avoided, then it is of central importance to clarify again 
the content and status of compassion or empathy within ethics. So my con-
cern now is to develop a concept which can do justice to the demands of an 
altruistic understanding of compassion. 
2. Shared humanity 
To do this I shall take up a characteristic mentioned in an article by 
Lawrence Blum and attempt to deepen it - in respect of the envisaged 
mediation of theological-ethical and moral-philosophical reflection." Blum 
defines compassion primarily in terms of its object. It relates to human 
beings, but largely also to animals and other entities which we shall not be 
concerned with here. The attention, the focus of compassion, is not the 
person as such but the state in which the person is. In order to arouse 
empathy, this state must be in close relation to the actual life or at least to the 
elementary well-being of the person; it must be capable of being described as 
misery, distress, suffering or the like. Thus empathy relates to a negative 
condition which points to a serious deficiency in respect of human life that 
can be described independently of subjective feeling. 
Blum defines the attitude of empathy with the aid of four constitutive 
elements. The first constitutive element of empathy is identification with the 
sufferer. Preserving the distance but recognizing a basic similarity between it 
and the sufferer, the empathizing person perceives this situation, transfers it 
imaginatively to his or her own situation, and thus achieves the change of 
perspective inherent in all moral action. 
The second constitutive element is concern for the well-being of the other. 
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This element ensures that the empathy is really focussed on the other and 
not on my notion of his or her situation. The imagination is in a way con-
trolled and guided by concern for the well-being of the other, and not for the 
other, with all the paternalistic connotations of that. Compassion thus 
become reflective, and only in this way fulfils the condition of a moral feel-
ing as a second-order feeling, which relates to the well-being of another. It is 
thus marked out as a partial concept of the more universal concept. We can 
also take up the third element mentioned by Blum and think about it further: 
Blum speaks of a 'shared humanity' which produces compassion. Put in more 
general terms, empathy necessitates the conviction that there is a binding 
link between me and the sufferer, so that the suffering of the other meets and 
affects me in my person. Frequently the binding link only becomes visible 
through an imagined change of perspective or through attention which 
brings the sufferer near. In ethics, recourse is frequently had to a shared 
capacity for suffering rather than shared humanity as the common element. 
I cannot clarify this here, but it is certainly the case that, as I have already 
said with reference to Metz, in compassion we begin from a shared concept 
of the common evil, which produces a fundamental fellowship and equality 
in relation to the respect due, and thus transcends the de facto inequality 
between the one who suffers and the one who does not. 
If we speak of empathy, we are also speaking of convictions which go with 
the sensitivity involved. We are also saying that these convictions, which 
cannot be detached from feelings but are interwoven with them, are of 
central importance for personal identity. In Charles Taylor's terminology, 
they are therefore strong valuations. This almost automatically gives rise to 
the fourth constitutive element of empathy mentioned by Blum, namely 
duration and intensity. A feeling which is based on convictions of central 
relevance cannot be completely abrupt and immediate. Thus duration and 
intensity are good criteria for the seriousness of a feeling. It need only be 
mentioned in passing that duration and intensity can suffer as a result of the 
modern media. It is not the attitude itself but the 'objects', the persons 
whose suffering we attempt to empathize with, that change so quickly that 
the quality of experience in compassion threatens to become shallow. Thus 
the greater nearness to the sufferers which is produced in the course of 
'globalization' cannot lead to a blunting of the sense which is the reflex 
action when too much is asked of them. 
We can now understand the spontaneous and reflective attitude of 
empathy more precisely as an attitude of perception, concerned attention 
and identification achieved in an imaginative way towards someone whose 
physical or psychological integrity is threatened, concern for the well-being 
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of the other and the realization of a fundamental commonality which creates 
fellowship. Who would not recognize here the goodness which the Old and 
New Testament define as the ethical content of compassion, and in addition, 
in the concept of mercy, as a property of God which as such is reflected on 
in the theology of memory?" But in that case cannot the biblical tradition 
also be a medium of the specific religious and ethical experience of responsi-
bility and concern, a reflective experience which emphasizes the central 
significance of compassion for action and also for faith? If empathy at least in 
part rests on a 'strong valuation', a conviction about the good which another 
lacks, then wherever possible it leads to an action which involves concern 
and resistance against this lack. Believers know that they are reinforced 
in this ethical attitude by a religious experience which is the historically 
mediated experience of the saving action of God, at least of his justice and 
mercy. The religious experience adds nothing to rhe ethical experience as 
such, but for the identity of the person who accepts this experience it is a 
conviction which then becomes inseparable from the ethical experience. 
However, not only the content of the concept of compassion but also its 
normative status must be clarified. In essence, rhe question here is wherher 
compassion itself is normative or wherher it is an addition to what is 
normally called ,for. Our conceptual analysis has indicated that compassion 
and empathy are an altruistic feeling, a feeling which reacts to the suffering 
of another person with a desire for his or her well-being. This feeling is 
backed by the conviction that the state of a suffering person or a suffering 
collective must if at all possible be remedied. Because and in so far as com-
passion builds a bridge between me and the other, and also between my 
identity and what should be, compassion may mediate between what one 
wills and what should be." Compassion is therefore a central ingredient of a 
person's moral identity; indeed I would go so far as to say that in this 
mediating function it is indispensable for morality. For the moral principles 
of respect and taking heed of persons have the same goal as compassion. In 
other words, the cognitive content of compassion converges wirh the 
normative demand and from the perspective of the compassionate is to be 
regarded as a normative demand. However spontaneous empathy may seem 
to be, it is therefore one of the most important sources, perhaps the most 
important source, of the insight why there are normative obligations for me 
and why I should act morally at all. Moreover, in so far as the bad state of a 
sufferer can be improved by action, empathy is also a motivation towards 
action on behalf of the other, ' 3 in close conjunction with the insight, which 
is and can be grounded in a normative way, that the sufferer has a right to 
this action. Thus in fact it is the case that here the verdict ofreason and the 
• 
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verdict of feeling meet. ' 4 But because empathy has not only a reflective but 
also a 'spontaneous' side which is given an emotional label through the 
suffering of another, both modes of judgment have the function of control-
ling each other: reason controls universal justice, feeling its specific form. 
However, empathy is not restricted, like normative morality, to the level 
of action but also continues to keep on guard where violations and integrities 
cannot either rest on human action or be removed by action. There can be 
and is empathy precisely when action comes up against its limits. Empathy 
may have to tread a tightrope in giving others their due in their suffering. 
But that tightrope indicates all the more the need for a reflective treatment 
of empathy. 
3. Contempt of the other? 
But does this conception really stand up to the charge of contempt of the 
other? I think that it does. For, first, the imagination of the change of per-
spective is not thought of naively as empathy or paternalistic identification, 
but must maintain a distance. Secondly, the other must himself or herself 
give the guidelines for determining the well-being on which the compassion 
is focussed. Thirdly, the reference to a common 'shared humanity' is a 
criterion which safeguards the preservation of the respect that is based on 
the normative equality of all. However, the closer definition of this sharing 
leaves much scope and is therefore also prone to paternalistic and ideological 
definitions. That makes it all the more important to link empathy up with a 
theory of rights which forms a basis for the normative claims of others and 
which for example also attempts to qualify the question of those addressed, 
the extent of the responsibiliry, the calculation of benefits and the right 
balance between different benefits. 
With the normative theory of rights we transcend the personal relations in 
which empathy has its roots and without which it cannot become effective. 
The question now is whether empathy can be made fruitful for a theory of 
justice, and if so, to what extent. I want at least to mention two points which 
can give us a direction. The basis of justice is the universal equality of moral 
subjects, which is set down in the convergence of rights and responsibilities. 
Justice perceives the other in the mode of normative equality understood in 
this way, and thus as the 'generalized other'." But in order to be able to take 
account of the individual and social inequality which is in fact to be per-
ceived, and in order to be able to perceive persons behind the structures of 
injustice, the other has to be regarded as a concrete other.'6 Empathy reacts 
to this equality by way of a spontaneous concern which has a reflective back-
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ing. Empathy with a structural focus recognizes the asymmetry between 
those who suffer and those who do not, which leads to an inequality in 
respect of the distribution of responsibilities and rights. So here, too, the 
cognitive content of the verdict of the feelings coincides with the normative 
verdict of justice. Empathy does not transcend justice; empathy is not grace 
which proceeds from grace. Rather, empathy is a function, a specific dimen-
sion of justice itself; one can perhaps say that it is the 'other of justice' which 
itself appears in justice. 
This form of justice sees that the other is special and reflects on the rele-
vance of this special character for norms. Paradoxical though it may seem, it 
makes the asymmetry the starting point of the concrete recognition and 
respect which is called on to preserve the right praxis, including theoretical 
reflection on it in a theory of justice. But over and above this, empathy points 
to a sense of solidarity which is grounded in the benevolence of the other. To 
assume responsibility for the sufferer cannot therefore stop at establishing 
the rules of behaviour. Nor can it stop at a definition of the rights of self-
defence, or make its correctness dependent on a consensus. Responsibility, 
which Metz's 'authority of the sufferers' recognizes as a normative point of 
reference, can only be formulated in a theory of justice which encounters 
structural injustice both individually and politically. To use a familiar 
image: for those lying on the ground, anyone who encounters them is 
infinitely far above them. Empathy which takes heed of others and recog-
nizes their fundamental normative equality, in other words empathy appro-
priate to the other, strives to synchronize the movements of concern and 
raising up. Concern is the personal, emotional side of empathy. But 'raising 
up' is the practical side, the justice which produces equality where it does 
not exist. This is the point of the parable of the Good Samaritan, the New 
Testament model for the appropriate emotional empathy with the sufferer 
which governs action. And once again we can - and must - say that the 
ethical dimension of this view of ethical responsibility within a theological 
definition of justice can easily be communicated. That the theological con-
cept of justice points beyond the ethical dimension to the eschatological 
dimension makes ethics a goad which remains until all injustice has been 
transformed into justice. It is not ethics but religion (the Christian religion) 
which gives ground for hoping that this goad is not God's last statement 
on suffering. However, theology must not fall in with this hope but must 
challenge God to a conversation; it must put the question of suffering and 
confront it with the 'landscape of screams', as God challenges human beings 
in their injustice. 
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Conclusion 
So if compassion is to be a programme for Christianity, first a 'systematic 
cover' needs to be incorporated into this programme which clarifies its con-
tent and status in dialogue with the tradition of moral philosophy and moral 
philosophy. Here 'attentive and perceptive recognition of participation in 
the suffering of the other' proves to be the partial element in the more 
general structure of care, an attitude of concern which itself calls for training 
and practice." It has the status of a mediating principle between what one 
wills and what should be. But this 'should' has to be given a basis and justi-
fied in a separate step, because involvement neither gives the basis for the 
moral 'should' nor can it guarantee that it is understood in universal terms. 
Margalit puts this sharply: 'We need morality precisely where we take no 
part. " 8 So if compassion is to be understood as a value programme of 
Christianity, then it must be understood as complementary to an ethic of 
human dignity which spells itself out as an ethic of human rights. This too 
cannot be based on a consensus nor can it issue in a procedural ethic. 
Nevertheless Metz puts his finger on the sore spot which Margalit identifies. 
Certainly morality is challenged in the face of emotional indifference. But 
how can indifference be overcome, if not by involvement, by compassion? 
And how else can moral action be motivated, if not by involvement, which 
also includes indignation about injustice and pain about the suffering of the 
sufferer? 
Translated by John Bowden 
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